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Abstract 
 
In a sample of European banks, we find that credit default swaps (CDS) are used for regulatory 
arbitrage to lower capital requirements and facilitate greater risk taking. Moreover, CDS-using 
banks generate higher returns on capital from the lower risk weighted assets they hold relative to 
banks that do not use CDS.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Bank capital standards (e.g., Basel III; the European Union’s (EU) Capital Requirements 
Regulation (CRR)) allow banks to reduce their required regulatory capital by using credit default 
swaps to transfer credit risk to third parties.1 This is a concern for at least three reasons (Cetina et 
al. 2015). First, even if real risk transfer takes place, these transactions pose financial stability 
concerns by increasing interconnectedness, transforming credit risk into counterparty risk, and 
obscuring capital adequacy to investors and counterparties. Second, while bank supervisors have 
extensive data about banks, they may have limited information about the nonbanks who are selling 
credit risk and ultimately bearing the risk of loss.2 Third, and the focus of this paper, a bank with 
a low regulatory capital ratio has an incentive to buy CDS to obtain regulatory capital relief by 
reducing the risk weights of corporate loans—i.e., CDS may be used for regulatory arbitrage to 
lower capital requirements. Research on CDS usage for regulatory capital relief is surprisingly 
limited. Pennacchi (1988) and Allen and Carletti (2006) suggest that banks may choose to transfer 
credit risks when facing capital and liquidity constraints, implying that banks can buy CDS to 
obtain regulatory capital relief by reducing the risk weights of their loans. Yorulmazer (2013) 
develops a theoretical model that predicts CDS can be used for regulatory arbitrage to lower capital 
requirements potentially resulting in excessive risk taking. Empirical evidence is restricted to Shan 
et al. (2014) and Hasan and Wu (2015) who report results supportive of the regulatory capital relief 
hypothesis. Shan et al. (2014) document that US banks’ total assets increase after they begin using 
                                                 
1 A key property of credit derivatives is that they separate the origination of credit, the funding of credit, and the 
holding and management of credit risk. Thus, banks that originate credit to corporate borrowers need no longer hold 
the credit risk associated with these loans, while other financial firms can hold credit risk without having to originate 
or fund the underlying credit. 
2 Cetina et al. (2015) point out that when AIG came under stress in 2008, European banks faced losing some of the 
$290 million in CDS protection that they had purchased from the company for regulatory capital relief.  
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CDS, while their risk weighted assets decrease, which they argue is an unintended consequence of 
bank capital regulations that allow the use of CDS to convert high risk weighted assets into low 
risk weighted assets. As such, banks can use CDS to hold less capital while complying with the 
requirements of regulatory capital ratios. In addition, CDS using banks generate higher returns on 
capital from the lower risk weight assets that they hold than do banks not using CDS. Hasan and 
Wu (2016) find a negative and significant correlation between net CDS protection and the 
regulatory capital ratio for US banks.  
 
In this paper, we test the regulatory relief hypothesis by examining CDS usage in a sample of 
European banks. The shift in focus from US banks is merited for three reasons. First, banks are 
considerably more important to finance in Europe, whereas there is a much greater reliance on the 
corporate bond market and other nonbank sources of finance in the US.3  This arguably makes the 
stakes in ensuring the safety of the banking system even higher in Europe (Cline 2017). Second, 
European banks use International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) while US banks use 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Because IFRS does not permit the netting out 
of derivatives, the reported assets of European banks tend to be larger than would be reported 
under GAAP and total leverage exposure tends to be much closer to total assets (Goldstein, 2017). 
Accordingly, the incentive to engage in regulatory arbitrage might be greater for European banks. 
Finally, our sample of European banks includes eleven that have been designated as globally 
systemically important banks (GSIBs) by the Financial Stability Board.4 Though the additional 
                                                 
3 For example, Merler and Véron (2015) estimate that in 2014, in the euro area bank loans accounted for 88% of 
financing to nonfinancial companies and debt securities only 12%, whereas in the US the share of loans was only 30% 
and that of debt securities 70%. 
4 For a list of GSIBs see http://www.fsb.org/2017/11/2017-list-of-global-systemically-important-banks-g-sibs/. 
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capital requirements for these banks under Basel III rules were not in place during our sample 
period, the expectation of higher capital requirements may have provided them with an additional 
incentive to engage in regulatory arbitrage.   
 
Our paper makes several contributions to the banking literature. First, it contributes to the growing 
literature on financial institutions’ activities that circumvent regulatory requirements by 
strategically managing their balance sheet variables to appear in compliance with regulatory 
requirements while engaging in additional risk taking. Second, we focus on how banks manage 
their risky portfolios from the perspective of bank capital and present direct evidence on how 
capital management is affected by the regulatory forbearance afforded by CDS. Third, in the design 
of bank regulation, policymakers are concerned about whether banks use CDS to hedge the risk of 
corporate lending, provide credit enhancement, obtain regulatory capital relief, or exploit private 
information.  
 
2. Models  
 
We carry out three tests of the regulatory relief hypothesis in the context of CDS usage by 
estimating Shan et al. (2014) and Hasan and Wu (2015)-type specifications for European banks. 
First, if banks use CDS for capital relief purposes, we should expect that banks that are more 
capital constrained are more likely to use CDS. Accordingly, we examine whether European banks 
that have a lower capital ratio in the prior quarter are more likely to use CDS in the next quarter 
by estimating the following specification:  
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𝐶𝐷𝑆_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑃1𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡         (1) 
 
where the dependent variable, 𝐶𝐷𝑆_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡, is a dummy taking the value of one if the bank takes a 
non-zero CDS position in quarter t, 𝐶𝐴𝑃1𝑖𝑡−1 is the ratio of tier 1 capital to total risk weighted 
assets lagged one period, 5 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of bank characteristics that may impact on CDS usage, 
and 𝛿𝑖 and 𝜑𝑡 capture bank and year fixed effects, respectively. 
 
Second, if banks use CDS for capital relief purposes we should expect that CDS using banks would 
achieve lower levels of risk weighted assets relative to total assets than would non-CDS using 
banks. We test this hypothesis by examining the impact of CDS usage on the total of banks’ risk 
weighted assets by estimating the following specification:  
 
(
𝑅𝑊𝐴
𝑇𝐴
)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐷𝑆_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡         (2) 
 
where the dependent variable, (
𝑅𝑊𝐴
𝑇𝐴
)𝑖𝑡, is the ratio of risk weighted assets to total assets for each 
bank and the variables 𝐶𝐷𝑆_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡, 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝛿𝑖, and 𝜑𝑡 are as defined in equation (1). 
 
Finally, Shan et al. (2014) argue that, ceteris paribus, banks using CDS for capital relief purposes 
should achieve a higher return on capital than banks that do not use CDS, reflecting the capital 
‘saving’ involved. They test for this possibility by examining the change in the return on equity 
after banks’ CDS usage in the following specification:  
                                                 
5 We use the ratio of tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets to measure bank capital adequacy because it is the best 
core measure of a bank’s financial strength.  
 6 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(
𝑅𝑊𝐴
𝑇𝐴
)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐷𝑆_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      (3) 
 
where the dependent variable, 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 is the return on equity, and (
𝑅𝑊𝐴
𝑇𝐴
)𝑖𝑡, 𝐶𝐷𝑆_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡, 𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝛿𝑖, 
and 𝜑𝑡 are as defined above. 
 
We estimate equations (1) - (3) employing a panel of quarterly data for 50 European banks from 
14 European Union countries for the period 2001Q1 to 2016Q1.6 The control variables in 𝑋𝑖𝑡 
include measures of bank size, net income structure and growth, market share, the return on equity 
and its volatility, liquidity, funding structure, and the notional amount of securitized assets. 
Summary statistics for the key variables are presented Table 1 and variable definitions and sources 
are given in the Appendix. Studies at the level of individual banks face an inherent endogeneity 
problem arising from reverse causality. For instance, it may be that a change in aggregate CDS 
position at the individual bank level affects a bank’s regulatory capital ratio. In other words, bank-
level explanatory variables on the right-hand side of a regression could be endogenous. We have 
lagged the explanatory variables to try to deal with this issue but recognize that endogeneity bias 
could still arise from serial correlations of the explanatory and dependent variables.  
 
3. Empirical results 
Estimates of equation (1) are reported in Table 2. In column 1 the coefficient of the lagged-one-
quarter Tier 1 capital ratio is -0.044, which is statistically significant at the 1% level, and indicates 
                                                 
6 The countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.  
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that lower capital adequacy is associated with a higher likelihood of using CDS after controlling 
for other variables that may affect a bank’s incentives to use CDS. The coefficients on the control 
variables suggest that there a higher likelihood of a bank using credit derivatives if it is relatively 
large, has a larger share of the deposit market, a higher return on equity, a larger share of funding 
is from bank deposits, a larger share of assets is securitized, and a higher share of income is from 
non-interest sources. Conversely, there is a lower likelihood of CDS usage if the return on equity 
is more volatile and the bank is relatively liquid. In column 2, we try to account for any differential 
impact on CDS use by globally systemically important banks (GSIB) by adding a 0-1 dummy 
(1=GSIB) to the estimate. The coefficient on the dummy variable is positive and statistically 
significant and suggests an increase in the probability of GSIBs using CDS of about 3.4% relative 
to other banks. However, the GSIB dummy seems likely to be capturing largely size effects as the 
bank size variable in the estimate is no longer statistically significant.  In column 3, we replace the 
CDS use dummy indicator with a continuous variable that measures a bank’s CDS usage, which 
is the logarithm of the CDS position (i.e., the sum of the bought (long) and sold (short) CDS 
positions by a bank). As for the result in columns 1 and 2, the coefficient of the lagged Tier 1 
capital ratio is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level and indicates that decrease in 
the Tier 1 capital ratio leads to an increase in the bank’s CDS total position in the next quarter. In 
column 4 we add the GSIB dummy, which again suggests a greater probability of these banks 
using CDS. 
 
Estimates of equation 2 are reported in Table 3. The results in column 1 and 2 show that CDS 
using banks have a smaller ratio of risk weighted-to-total assets, consistent with a bank moving its 
existing assets to a lower-risk category. For example, in column 1, on average, the risk weighted 
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assets ratio is lowered by 0.111 (or 17.8% relative to the sample mean of the risk weighted assets 
ratio) after banks start using CDS. The result in column suggests a great probability that GSIB will 
lower their risk weighted assets relative to other banks. Columns 3 and 4 report results when the 
CDS use indicator is the logarithm of total CDS contracts and columns 5 and 6 reports results 
when it is the logarithm of the amounts of CDS sold by each bank (because if banks can reduce 
their risk weighted assets using CDS, then the effects should be more relevant to CDS bought than 
CDS sold). In each sets of results, there is a negative and statistically significant association 
between the CDS position and the risk weighted assets ratio. In all the estimates, the coefficients 
on the GSIB dummy indicate the reduction in the risk weighted asset ratio of GSIBs is greater than 
that of other banks. 
 
Estimates of equation (3) are reported in Table 4, where we present results using the alternative 
indicators of CDS use and the bank-specific control variables. The results show that CDS use has 
a positive and highly statistically significant impact on the return on equity, consistent with CDS 
use ‘saving’ bank capital. In addition, the coefficients on the ratio risk weighted assets ratio are 
positive and statistically significant suggesting that a riskier asset portfolio generates a higher 
return on equity. Finally, the return on equity increases when a larger share of bank funding is 
from deposits and falls when a larger share of bank assets is securitized. These results continue to 
hold when controlling for GSIB banks (columns 2.4,6 and 8), where the coefficients on the GSIB 
dummy indicate a relatively larger return on equity for these banks than for others. 
 
4. Conclusion 
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Our results for European banks indicate that credit default swaps are used to engage in regulatory 
arbitrage, and that CDS use generates higher returns on capital because of the lower ratio of risk 
weighted assets that results. Our results imply that: (i) the calculation of risk exposure under the 
Basel III and the EU’s CRR capital rules may not reflect the actual risk of banks that use CDS 
when counterparty risk is considered; and (ii) a lower ratio of risk weighed to total assets does not 
necessarily indicate that a bank’s asset portfolio is less risky. The results are consistent with recent 
empirical work on CDS use in US banks. 
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Table 1. 
Summary statistics for European banks, 2001Q1 to 2016Q1 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
CDS bought ($ millions)   1.13   5.54   0.00   80.27 
CDS sold ($ millions)   7.87  14.80   0.12   77.91 
CDS total ($ millions)   9.01  20.34   0.00 158.18 
Tier 1 capital ratio (%)  12.04   6.34   1.03  91.90 
Risk-weighted assets to total assets  62.69 18.41   0.10  88.53 
Size ($ millions)  19.65   1.30  12.38  22.00 
Return on equity (%)  10.02   9.26   0.04  96.80 
Return on equity volatility (%)    0.15   0.31   0.00   2.28 
Liquidity (%)    0.13   0.35   0.00   8.27 
Market share (%)    2.41   2.69   0.00  17.22 
Net income growth (%)    0.08   0.29  -4.18    4.94 
Non-interest income/operating income (%)  46.27  19.56   1.06 100.00 
Total deposits/total liabilities (%)  66.41  23.78   0.22  94.34 
Securitized assets ($ millions)  15.20  11.70   2.84  44.10 
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Table 2. 
Determinants of CDS use by European banks: Logit and panel regression results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable CDS_dum log (1+CDS) 
Capital ratio   -0.044*** 
  (0.004) 
 -0.078*** 
 (0.014) 
  -0.142*** 
  (0.022) 
 -0.125** 
 (0.036) 
Size    7.466*** 
  (1.025) 
  1.315 
 (0.955) 
  10.013*** 
   (0.913) 
  3.309 
 (3.186) 
Return on equity    0.054** 
  (0.021) 
 -0.061 
 (0.045) 
  -0.115** 
  (0.048) 
 -0.038 
 (0.107) 
Return on equity volatility   -3.961** 
  (1.868) 
 -5.003* 
 (2.196) 
   2.248 
  (4.444) 
 -4.811 
 (4.551) 
Liquidity   -0.198*** 
  (0.019) 
 -0.484* 
 (0.092) 
   0.051 
  (0.017) 
 -0.756** 
 (0.255) 
Market share    0.391*** 
  (0.017) 
  0.616*** 
 (0.206) 
   0.435*** 
  (0.010) 
  0.727 
 (0.436) 
Net income growth    1.283 
  (1.167) 
 -3.103 
 (2.940) 
   0.484* 
  (0.247) 
  4.699** 
 (1.904) 
Non-interest income/total income    0.225*** 
  (0.034) 
 -0.064 
 (0.055) 
   0.381*** 
  (0.048) 
 -0.132 
 (0.106) 
Deposits/total liabilities    0.134***   
  (0.020) 
  0.025 
 (0.038) 
   0.202*** 
  (0.022) 
  0.092 
 (0.075) 
Log (1+securitized assets)    5.025*** 
  (0.814) 
  1.081 
 (0.760) 
   6.566*** 
  (0.729) 
  1.068 
 (4.355) 
GSIB dummy    3.419*** 
 (0.955) 
   4.311** 
 (1.417) 
Constant  -55.773*** 
   (4.909) 
108.366*** 
 (31.932) 
 -68.686*** 
   (4.477) 
166.122** 
 (47.239) 
R-squared     0.563     0.515     0.428    0.405 
Observations       202    202      202    202 
Year fixed effects      Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes 
Bank fixed effects      Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes 
Column 1 and report results from a logit regression in which the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a bank uses 
credit default swaps and zero otherwise. Columns 3 and report results from a panel regression in which the dependent 
variable is log (1+CDS) where CDS equals bank’s holdings of credit default swaps. GSIB is a 0-1 dummy where 1 
indicates a globally systemically important bank. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 3.  
Risk weighted assets and CDS use in European banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CDS_dum    -0.111*** 
   (0.024) 
 -0.831*** 
 (0.209) 
    
Log (1+CDS, total)      -0.046*** 
   (0.009) 
 -0.048** 
 (0.013) 
  
Log (1+CDS, bought)          -0.086*** 
   (0.012) 
 -0.109*** 
 (0.024) 
Size    -0,065** 
   (0.028) 
 -0.153 
 (0.183) 
   -0.752*** 
   (0.143) 
 -0.802*** 
 (0.156) 
   -0.398** 
   (0.170) 
  0.439 
 (0.297) 
Market share    -0.034** 
   (0.012) 
 -0.258*** 
 (0.060) 
   -0.242*** 
   (0.036) 
 -0.260*** 
 (0.061) 
   -0.212*** 
   (0.033) 
 -0.239*** 
 (0.054) 
Net income growth    -0.088** 
   (0.027) 
  0.167 
 (0.700) 
   -0.312 
   (0.457) 
  0.202 
 (0.698) 
   -0.281 
   (0.440) 
  0.413 
 (0.763) 
Non-interest income/total income    -0.007*** 
   (0.001) 
  -0.032*** 
 (0.008) 
   -0.017*** 
   (0.005) 
 -0.027*** 
 (0.008) 
   -0.032*** 
   (0.006) 
  0.055*** 
 (0.012) 
Deposits/total liabilities     0.010*** 
   (0.002) 
 -0.005 
 (0.005) 
    0.001 
   (0.003) 
 -0.006 
 (0.005) 
    0.007** 
   (0.003) 
   0.004 
 (0.005) 
Log (1+securitized assets)     0.228*** 
   (0.056) 
  1.400*** 
 (0.289) 
    1.228*** 
   (0.114) 
  1.310*** 
 (0.285) 
   -1.476*** 
   (0.126) 
  1.939*** 
 (0.363) 
GSIB dummy   -0.823*** 
 (0.156) 
  -0.802*** 
 (0.156) 
    -1.115*** 
 (0.186) 
Constant    -3.127** 
   (1.081) 
 30.899*** 
 (5.630) 
   38.503*** 
   (0.114) 
 31.586*** 
 (5.862) 
   36.473*** 
   (2.460) 
 29.730*** 
 (4.888) 
R-squared     0.639   0.615      0.747      0.603     0.781   0.695 
Observations     236   236      268    268     268    268 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The dependent variable is the ratio of risk weighted assets to total assets. GSIB is a 0-1 dummy where 1 indicates a globally systemically important bank. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *** and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1 and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.  
Return of equity and CDS use in European banks 
 (1) (2)        (3)      (4) (5)     (6)   (7)                     (8) 
CDS_dum 3.133** 
(1.105) 
  2.447** 
 (1.061) 
  2.325** 
 (0.924) 
  3.561*** 
 (1.097) 
    
Log (1+CDS total)        0.175** 
  (0.077) 
  0.196* 
 (0.104) 
  
Log (1+CDS bought)         0.412*** 
 (0.139) 
  0.430*** 
 (0.024) 
Risk weighted-to-total assets     1.630* 
 (0.962) 
  4.704*** 
 (1.378) 
   2.905** 
  (1.378) 
  5.148*** 
 (1.278) 
  3.927*** 
 (1.615) 
  3.066*** 
 (1.177) 
Size   1.333 
 (2.314) 
  1.914 
 (2.405) 
  0.368 
 (2.242) 
  0.030** 
 (0.015) 
   0.993 
  (1.827) 
  0.030* 
 (0.016) 
  3.433 
 (2.675) 
  0.062*** 
 (0.013) 
Market share   0.783 
 (0.686)  
  0.716 
 (0.681) 
  0.687 
 (0.561)  
 -8.574 
 (4.963) 
   1.352 
  (0.899) 
 -9.703 
 (5.329) 
  1.388 
 (0.878) 
 -5.792 
 (3.865) 
Net income growth  -0.616 
 (3.084) 
 -1.344 
 (3.128) 
 -0.284 
 (5.033) 
  1.893 
 (1.476) 
  -3.343 
  (7.656) 
  1.899 
 (1.490) 
 -3.342 
 (7.293) 
  1.989 
 (1.499) 
Non-interest income/total income  -0.069 
 (0.068) 
 -0.006 
 (0.062) 
 -0.069 
 (0.068) 
 -1.328 
 (6.076) 
  -0.048 
  (0.050) 
 -1.358 
 (6.126) 
 -0.146 
 (0.149) 
 -1.161 
 (5.937) 
Deposits/total liabilities   0.053*** 
 (0.014) 
  0.035** 
 (0.013) 
  0.053*** 
 (0.014) 
  0.015 
 (0.056) 
   0.087** 
  (1.598) 
  0.048 
 (0.056) 
  0.139*** 
 (0.043) 
 -0.083 
 (0.097) 
Log (1+securitized assets)  -3.294*** 
 (0.860) 
 -1.543* 
 (0.804) 
 -3.294*** 
 (0.860) 
  0.197** 
 (0.097) 
  -3.202** 
  (1.598) 
  0.106*** 
 (0.010) 
 -5.334*** 
 (2.059) 
  0.195** 
 (0.079) 
GSIB dummy      4.830*** 
 (1.385) 
   4.704*** 
 (1.378) 
   4.174*** 
 (2.024) 
   3.066*** 
 (1.177) 
Constant  40.911 
(39.937) 
 71.122 
(41.554) 
 40.911 
(39.937) 
 216.987 
(137.819) 
 96.952 
(68.408) 
220.023 
(139.289) 
108.951 
(70.337) 
 229.189 
(142.459) 
R-squared   0.158   0.222   0.158   0.338  0.232   0.334    0.270   0.350 
Observations 187  187 187 187 187 187 187 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The dependent variable is the ratio of the return on equity. GSIB is a 0-1 dummy where 1 indicates a globally systemically important bank. Robust standard 
errors are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Appendix Table.  
Variable descriptions and data sources  
Variable Description Source Expected 
sign 
  
CDS_dum Dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank takes a 
nonzero CDS position  
Bankscope  
Net CDS position The sum of the notional US dollar amount of 
CDS protection bought and sold by each bank 
 
Bankscope  
Capital ratio Ratio of Tier 1 capital to total risk-weighted 
assets for each bank 
Bankscope - 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets for each bank Bankscope + 
Return on equity (ROE) Ratio of net income to common shareholder 
equity for each bank 
Bankscope + 
ROE volatility The standard deviation of quarterly ROE in the 
past four quarters 
Bankscope - 
Liquidity Ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total 
deposits for each bank 
Bankscope - 
Market share Share (%) of each bank’s deposits in the total 
deposits aggregated across all banks in the 
sample in each quarter 
Bankscope/author calculation + 
Net income growth Ratio of the change in each bank’s net income 
from quarter t-1 to quarter t scaled by total 
assets in quarter t-1 
Bankscope/author calculation - 
Non-interest 
income/operating income 
Ratio of non-interest income to total operating 
income for each bank 
Bankscope + 
Total deposits/total liabilities Ratio of total deposits to total liabilities of each 
bank 
Bankscope + 
Securitized assets Natural logarithm of the outstanding amount of 
each bank’s securitized assets 
Bankscope + 
GSIB dummy Dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank is globally 
systemically important 
http://www.fsb.org/2017/11/2017-
list-of-global-systemically-
important-banks-g-sibs/ 
? 
    
 
 
